Introduction: History Repeats — Why the U.S. Approach to Iran Risks the Same Failure as with North Korea
For decades, U.S. diplomacy with nuclear-aspiring states has followed a troubling pattern: offers of incentives followed by broken promises and renewed hostility. As Washington appears to revisit a similar strategy with Iran that once failed catastrophically with North Korea, this piece explores the risks of repeating diplomatic mistakes that may push Tehran toward nuclear weaponization instead of peace.
Broken Promises, Rising Threats: How Washington’s Playbook Risks Repeating History with Iran
There are growing signs that U.S.-Iran relations may be entering a new, potentially more volatile phase. Recent reports suggest that the Trump administration considered offering Iran a $30 billion package to support a civilian nuclear program. In exchange, Iran would be expected to fully dismantle all uranium enrichment activities—including the low-level 3.7% enrichment widely recognized as consistent with peaceful use.
This proposal closely mirrors an earlier U.S. initiative toward North Korea in the 1990s. Under President Clinton, Washington offered Pyongyang sanctions relief, diplomatic normalization, and technical assistance to build pressurized water reactors for civilian energy, coordinated with the IAEA and international partners—if North Korea dismantled its entire nuclear program, including facilities and weapons ambitions.
From Pyongyang to Tehran: The U.S. Pattern of Offers, Betrayals, and Backlash
Initially, North Korea accepted the deal and took steps such as dismantling facilities and disposing of fuel. For a time, the agreement seemed like a diplomatic success. Yet a now-familiar pattern emerged: the U.S. treated the signed accord not as a conclusion but as a prelude to more contentious phases. This pattern is no accident—it reflects a broader U.S. strategic playbook, as documented by analyses like the RAND Corporation’s paper on inducements followed by pressure to manage adversaries. This approach has repeatedly fueled instability rather than resolving conflicts. It has been evident not only with North Korea but also with the JCPOA between Iran and the P5+1, and the Minsk Agreements, both later undermined or abandoned by Washington.
The Illusion of Diplomacy: Why Sanctions and Deals Keep Failing with Iran and North Korea
In North Korea’s case, domestic U.S. criticism quickly followed the deal. Opponents argued it offered excessive concessions without sufficient guarantees. When President George W. Bush assumed office, he scrapped the accord, labeled North Korea part of the “Axis of Evil,” and embraced a regime change policy. Faced with this shift, North Korea resumed its weapons program and conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. Today, it maintains a functional nuclear arsenal.
The reported offer to Iran follows this failed model. Even if Iran accepted, precedent suggests domestic opposition in Washington would soon challenge or dismantle it. Tehran’s compliance would not guarantee reciprocity—sanctions would likely remain, and promised aid might never materialize.
$30 Billion and No Trust: Why Iran’s Nuclear Dilemma Mirrors North Korea’s Past
Though no formal confirmation has surfaced, circumstantial evidence points to such a plan, especially amid recent U.S.-Iran exchanges. President Trump hinted at possible negotiations, including a potential meeting in Oman. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi swiftly denied any talks, stating Tehran neither agreed to nor discussed such possibilities.
In an interview with Tasnim News Agency, Araghchi accused the U.S. of undermining diplomacy through military actions, particularly alongside Israel. He dismissed talk of negotiations, saying, “There has not even been any talk of negotiations. The subject is out of the question at present.” He warned that while Iran remains open to diplomacy, “the ground must be prepared”—a statement fraught with ominous implications.
Diplomatic Déjà Vu: How Washington’s Failed Strategy Pushes Iran Toward Nuclear Arms
It appears Iran, having learned of the proposed $30 billion offer—reportedly to be presented by Steve Wickoff—rejected it outright. Trump later denied the offer’s existence on Truth Social, calling it “another hoax,” only to contradict himself by posting he had been “working on the possible removal of sanctions and other things.” This contradiction suggests the proposal was real, and Iran’s rejection provoked Trump’s frustration.
Araghchi reaffirmed Iran’s position on X, saying if the U.S. president genuinely seeks a deal, he should change his tone and cease threats against Iran’s Supreme Leader and people. He warned illusions about Iran’s strength could lead to grave miscalculations, and that Iran would not hesitate to demonstrate its “Real Capabilities”—likely signaling a possible policy shift, including nuclear weaponization.
The Real Consequences of U.S. Bad Faith: Iran’s Nuclear Future at a Dangerous Crossroads
Despite public insistence that Iran will not pursue nuclear weapons, internal dynamics suggest otherwise. Supreme Leader Khamenei’s fatwa prohibiting nuclear arms, often cited as definitive, is not universally accepted within Iran’s political and clerical elite. Figures such as the late General Salami of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps openly questioned the fatwa’s viability, advocating for a deterrent capability.
Uranium enrichment to 60%—far beyond civilian needs—has long been framed as a bargaining chip. Yet this explanation may overlook deeper internal divisions. The enrichment effort likely reflects a compromise: appeasing factions favoring weaponization while placating moderates who seek to avoid overt proliferation.
From Negotiations to Nuclear Options: The Perils of a Collapsing Framework with Iran
Iran’s political system, fragmented among competing power centers, often produces compromises satisfying no one fully. Supreme Leader Khamenei must balance these interests rather than issue unilateral decisions. The current approach—high-level enrichment short of weaponization—reflects this delicate balance. However, recent events indicate the internal debate may now favor advocates of a full nuclear capability.
A widely read article by Arnaud Bertrand, “The Key Lesson from Iran: Kim Jong-un Was Right About Everything,” highlights this shift. Bertrand argues that Iran’s transparency and cooperation with international bodies—particularly the IAEA—have backfired. Instead of protection, openness has exposed Iran’s nuclear infrastructure to sabotage and attack, as recent Israeli strikes on well-documented sites show.
Why Transparency Backfired: Lessons Iran Learned from North Korea’s Nuclear Journey
Bertrand draws four strategic lessons: First, states seeking security must develop nuclear weapons outside international monitoring. Second, transparency can be a liability. Third, rejecting Western technology and cultivating indigenous systems is vital for cyber resilience. Fourth, only a credible deterrent guarantees survival in a hostile international environment.
These conclusions echo broader assessments. The failure to adopt secure communications left Iranian military officials vulnerable to cyber intrusions—including personal threats via mobile devices. One widely circulated audio recording of such a threat has reportedly been authenticated by The Washington Post, with some analysts suggesting an intentional leak by Israeli intelligence.
Cyberattacks, Sabotage, and Suspicion: Iran’s Path to Nuclear Deterrence?
These developments reveal a grim new reality: cyberattacks, psychological operations, and targeted threats against families in Iran are becoming normalized tools of modern statecraft. Iran and similarly targeted states increasingly view these tactics as licenses for escalation—both defensive and offensive.
The policy implications are stark. Some analysts now argue Iran should follow North Korea’s path—ending all IAEA cooperation, abandoning U.S. negotiations, rejecting Western technology, and developing an autonomous nuclear deterrent. This would mark a profound shift toward unilateralism and self-reliance.
The Fallout of Broken Deals: How U.S. Policy Fuels Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions
Statements by officials like Araghchi suggest this shift may already be underway. His vow that “any steps” may be taken to protect Iran’s interests leaves the nuclear option open. His omission of reaffirming the anti-nuclear fatwa is telling. Iran’s relationship with the IAEA appears effectively severed, with little prospect for re-engagement.
While many Western observers long hoped Iran would avoid nuclear weaponization, recent developments cast doubt on that outcome. Iranian leaders may now view an independent nuclear deterrent as both logical and essential. Even voices in Turkey and Saudi Arabia reportedly discuss the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran.
No More Second Chances: Iran’s Growing Resolve in the Face of U.S. Duplicity
In this context, some advocate a different path: deepening ties with Russia and China, joining BRICS, and accepting defense partnerships that enhance strategic depth without nuclear escalation. Iranian officials have shown no sign of distancing from Russia despite Western speculation. Claims of a pivot away from Moscow remain unsubstantiated.
Yet, within Iran, pro-nuclear voices seem ascendant. Should Iranian leadership eventually declare nuclear capability, Western governments will likely respond with outrage—blaming Iran outright while ignoring the long history of diplomatic sabotage and unilateral escalation that led here.
When Diplomacy Fails: The Strategic Risks of America’s Fragmented Foreign Policy
In truth, responsibility rests with those who undermined years of diplomacy: those who abandoned the JCPOA, demanded unconditional concessions, and refused to honor agreements. If Iran pursues nuclear weapons, it will be not because diplomacy failed, but because diplomacy was systematically destroyed.
U.S. foreign policy—attempting to simultaneously confront Russia, China, and Iran—has stretched American resources thin and eroded strategic coherence. The much-touted “pivot to Asia” never fully materialized, as bureaucratic factions continued prioritizing other regions. Consequently, American grand strategy has become fragmented, reactive, and ultimately unsustainable.
The $30 Billion Mirage: Washington’s False Hope and Iran’s Nuclear Reality
Russia has not collapsed; it has consolidated power. China is advancing at an even faster pace. And Iran—after enduring years of sanctions, sabotage, and diplomatic duplicity—may now judge that its security lies not in negotiation, but in deterrence.
That outcome is still avoidable—but only through a serious, overdue reassessment of Western policy. Thus far, no such course correction is evident. On the contrary, current actions suggest a doubling down on the very strategies that invite escalation—and risk catastrophe.